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Abstract
In this article, we argue that the history of bail foretells the future of parole. Under a plan
called the Conditional Post-Conviction Release Bond Act (recently passed into law in
three states), US prisoners can secure early release only after posting ‘post-conviction
bail’. As with pre-trial bail, the fledgling model would require prisoners to pay a percent-
age of the bail amount to secure their release under the contractual responsibility of a
commercial bail agency. If release conditions are breached, bounty hunters are legally
empowered to seize and return the parolee to prison. Our inquiry outlines the origins of
this post-conviction bond plan and the research upon which it is based. Drawing on the
‘new penology’ framework, we identify several underlying factors that make for a ripe
advocacy environment and set the stage for widespread state-level adoption of this plan
in the near future. Post-conviction bail fits squarely within the growing policy trends
toward privatization, managerialism, and actuarial justice. Most importantly, though,
advocates have the benefit of precedent on their side, as most US states have long
relied on a system of commercial bail bonding and private bounty hunting to manage
conditional pretrial release.
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In 2007, the actress Lindsay Lohan famously lost control of her Mercedes-Benz
convertible and ran the vehicle up a curb. Police found cocaine in the car and
arrested Lohan for driving under the inﬂuence. Her bail was set at $25,000
(Van Gelder, 2007). Subsequent arrests (a public altercation with a member of
her personal staﬀ, possession of cocaine, driving with a suspended license) pro-
duced additional arrests and monetary bail stipulation ranging from $20–40,000. In
February 2011, the actress was caught stealing a $2500 necklace. This time, her bail
was set at $40,000 (Cieply, 2011). In each of the above cases, Lohan had no prob-
lem posting bail and securing her freedom pre-trial.
Despite these personal troubles, the young celebrity was certainly lucky in one
regard: 70 percent of defendants subject to monetary bail between $25,000 and
$50,000 are not able to post bail and end up serving their pretrial detention period
in jail. One in ﬁve of such persons are ultimately acquitted of the crime or have
their case dismissed but serve jail time anyhow (Cohen and Reeves, 2007). In other
words, ‘Those with ﬁnancial means are able to purchase their freedom, while those
without ﬁnancial means lose their liberty during a period when they are presumed
innocent’ (Clark, 2007: 31).
The primary option for people in trouble with the law who do not have access to
Lohan’s personal wealth and connections is to turn to commercial bonding agencies.
Such third party entities can issue a bail bond whereby the individual secures his/her
freedom in exchange for a non-refundable fee of around 10 percent of the bail
amount plus collateral (real estate, automobiles, etc.). Under this contractual
arrangement, the bonding agent makes a ‘guarantee’ to the court that the accused
will attend his or her court date(s). The standard contract grants the bonding
agent near total control over the accused person’s freedom, authorizing the agent
or his/her designee to monitor, detain, and/or terminate the arrangement (i.e.
re-incarcerate) at will. In the event of a breach of contract, the bonding agent usually
relies on a network of private ‘bounty hunters’ to locate and return to government
custody those who try to abscond. Only two other countries in the world (Philippines
and Liberia) have comparable systems of commercial bail bonding (Devine, 1991).
The US system of commercial bail has numerous domestic critics, however.
Both the American Bar Association and the National District Attorney’s
Association have long advocated its abolishment. Forty years ago, the legal scholar
Ronald Goldfarb (1965: 4) wrote:
The [US] bail system is to a great degree a socially countenanced ransom of people
and of justice for no good reason. It is an unworkable and unreasonable abortive
outgrowth of historical Anglo-American legal devices which worked once in a far
diﬀerent time and place and in a far diﬀerent way.
Scandals involving collusion between commercial bonding agencies and mem-
bers of the criminal justice system have led four states – Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon
and Wisconsin1 – to abandon their commercial system of bail (Liptak, 2008).
Nonetheless, the use of commercial bail bonding is increasing in those jurisdictions
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that still allow it. In 2004, around 42 percent of pretrial releases resulted from the
payment of surety bonds through commercial bail agents (compared to 22 percent
in 1992). There are now an estimated 14,000 commercial bail agents nationwide in
what has become a lucrative business in trying economic times (Cohen and Reaves,
2007).
We posit that it is likely that this system of commercial bonding and private
bounty hunters will become the model for community corrections more generally
within the next decade. In fact, if advocates get their way, probation2 and parole
systems in every US state could be replaced by a structure almost identical to the
modern, commercial bail establishment. Under this proposed model, a judge or
paroling authority would set a price for every prisoner’s early release from prison.
If a prisoner wants to be released before the completion of his or her entire sen-
tence, s/he will have to ﬁnd the sum to put up as collateral to insure his or her good
behavior. Those with ﬁnancial means would simply put up the requisite amount
from their personal ﬁnances as collateral and collect it back again after their time
on parole. The majority, however, will have to rely upon the system of bail bonds-
men. These commercial entities will employ ﬁnancial coercion and a search and
seizure authority to ensure that individuals adhere to all the conditions of their
release, terminating the contract at will, and/or sending bounty hunters out to
return them to prison.3 Many prisoners will not get this chance, of course, as
they will be rejected by the private companies as bad risks. The rest will not be
able to aﬀord the fee that agencies charge or will have lost any contact with friends
or family who could. In these circumstances, persons will have to serve out their
complete sentence behind bars – not because they are necessarily deemed ‘high
risk’, but because they are poor.
Such is the future for parole if a conservative lobbying group called the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is successful – and ALEC often
gets its way (see Nichols, 2011). ALEC is a non-proﬁt organization, comprised of
over 2400 state legislators representing all 50 states, nearly 100 former members of
the US Congress, and more than 250 corporate or foundation sponsors; it uses a
multi-million dollar budget to advance a conservative legislative agenda. The
group’s impact to date has been substantial; its website (www.alec.org) claims
responsibility for nearly 1000 bills annually based upon ALEC generated model
legislation, with 20 percent eventually becoming law.
The parole scenario above is a paraphrase of a piece of model legislation ALEC
(2007) has drafted known as the ‘Conditional Post-Conviction Release Bond Act’
introduced in their report entitled, A Plan to Reduce Prison Overcrowding and
Violent Crime. Under the plan, states rely on performance bonds, and security or
indemnity agreements to keep released ex-prisoners from committing new crimes
and ‘assure their prompt return to custody should they misbehave’ (2007: 3). When
the ALEC plan was recently introduced as a bill in California, the proposal set the
maximum amount of post-conviction bail at $100,000 and the minimum at
$15,000. As with pre-trial bail, the individual pays a percentage of this amount
as a non-refundable charge in order to be released to the responsibility of a
Maruna et al. 317
 at Queens University on August 6, 2012pun.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
commercial bail agency. Persons in the participant’s release environment, such as
parents and guardians, voluntarily sign ‘agreements of indemnity’ whereby they,
along with the individual, would have a monetary incentive as indemnitors to the
surety (2007: 3). Upon the ‘breach of any single condition of release’, the bond
‘could be revoked by the court, a warrant issued’ and bounty hunters can be legally
empowered to bring the individual back to prison (or else the surety would be
penalized). Assuming that the structure of post-conviction bail would replicate
that of the current pre-conviction release system, a dozen or so multi-billion
dollar surety insurance companies would indemnify the bonding agent and serve
to insulate the local agent (and for practical purposes the corporate indemniﬁer)
from having to reimburse the court in the event of oﬀender non-compliance.
Versions of this piece of model legislation have already been passed into law in
Mississippi, South Dakota and Michigan, and are pending discussion in numerous
others.
In this article, we draw on a ‘new penology’ framework (Feeley and Simon,
1992) to argue that ALEC’s plan for release bonds is likely to become a reality
for many more states in the near future. We make this case on several grounds
familiar to the new penology literature, in particular: the trends toward privatiza-
tion, managerialism and actuarial criminal justice and crisis of legitimacy for par-
oling agencies and authorities arising from the lack of a purposeful narrative for
this work (see especially Simon, 1993). Most importantly, however, we argue that
the ALEC plan is likely to succeed because in 46 US states parallel situations
already exist. In these states commercial bail bonding is perceived as a legitimate
business and even so-called ‘bounty hunting’ has become a popular, respectable,
and even gloriﬁed pursuit. In short, we will argue that the history of bail foretells
the future of parole.
In making our case, we begin with the future, outlining ALEC’s proposal and its
origins. We then provide a history4 of commercial bail in the United States, demar-
cating four, distinct eras, to demonstrate how bureaucratic and commercial inter-
ests have shaped bail practices over time. Our goal with this history is a
Foucauldian one: to make the familiar appear strange (Garland, 1990). Malcolm
Feeley (2002a: 325) argues that: ‘Money bail has become such an integral feature of
the criminal process that its private nature is all but invisible.’ In other words, we
have learned to take commercial bail for granted in the United States.5 Our hope is
that the juxtaposition of our discussion of the future of parole alongside a history
of bail will allow both to be understood in a new light – as the newest and oldest
exemplars of the ‘new penology’ (Feeley and Simon, 1992).
The future of parole? Free market reintegration
In February 2008, two Rhode Island state senators introduced a bill titled
‘The Conditional Post Conviction Release Act’ (S 2734). The exact same bill had
been introduced in California by State Senator Ray Haynes6 (SB 441) years earlier,
and similar bills have been introduced in state houses of representatives and state
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senates of South Dakota, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, Hawaii,
Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Arizona, and Maine.7 To date, Mississippi in 2008
(§99-5-39), Michigan (HB 4437) in 2009, and South Dakota (SB 110)8 have all
successfully passed conditional post-conviction release acts, while North
Carolina (HB 1338) and Indiana (HB 1354) have bills pending at the time of
writing.9 On their introduction, these bills are almost identical in text and intent.
This is no remarkable coincidence but rather the result of a concerted eﬀort by
ALEC to gain widespread adoption of the concept even though these origins were
virtually unknown by voters in the states where these bills have been promoted.10
Indeed, ALEC has been referred to as ‘one of the nation’s most powerful – and
least known – corporate lobbies’ (Olsson, 2002: 1) and ‘the most powerful lobby
you’ve never heard of’ (Dolovich, 2005: 523). It was founded by the late Paul
Weyrich, a conservative activist who also founded or co-founded the Heritage
Foundation, the Moral Majority, and the Free Congress Foundation and is con-
sidered by some to be the ‘father of the religious right’ (Luo, 2007: 1). Unlike his
other high-proﬁle organizations, however, ALEC has managed to operate stealthily
and in near secrecy. Indeed, no mention is made of the group in Weyrich’s recent
New York Times obituary (Weber, 2008). This lack of recognition is ‘just the way
ALEC likes it’ (Penniman, 2002: 12) and is said to be the secret behind the group’s
power and success. In his article ‘What makes ALEC smart?’ Greenblatt (2003: 30)
writes, ‘You don’t hear too much about this right-leaning state pressure group.
Maybe that’s why it wins so often.’ The organization’s critics – most notably the
group called ‘ALECWatch’ consisting of the directors of Defenders of Wildlife and
the Natural Resources Defense Council – largely agree, referring to ALEC as a
‘Trojan Horse’ for rightwing corporate interests (Schlickeisen and Adams,
2002).11 In the ﬁrst section below, we highlight the origins of ALEC’s plan to pri-
vatize community corrections on the bail model. This is followed by a discussion
exploring the logic behind the argument and the core premises on which it is based.
Tracing the origins of an idea
The speciﬁc origins of the Conditional Post-Conviction Release Act (hereafter,
CPCRA) are obscure, to be sure. The published release date of ALEC’s Plan to
Reduce Prison Overcrowding and Violent Crime is 2007, but post-conviction bail is
an idea that has been pushed by ALEC’s state senators and representatives, as well
as various conservative think tanks, for at least a decade. Nonetheless, the 2007
ALEC proposal presents the idea as a novel one, and contains only 15 citations to
previous research and discussion of this idea. Four key footnotes refer to a paper
by Morgan O. Reynolds (2000).12 Critically, Reynolds’ (2000: 3) paper is cited for
the blanket claim, ‘The private sector appearance bond system is a well proven
workable model.’ Although not explicitly stated, the ALEC report makes it clear
that Reynolds is the intellectual author of the idea behind ALEC’s post-conviction
bond act,13 the entire proposal being little more than a paraphrase of Reynolds’
(2000) paper Privatizing Probation and Parole.
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Reynolds is an established libertarian thinker whose work brought him to the
attention of the neo-conservatives in the George W. Bush Administration, earning
him a post as the Chief Economist for the Department of Labor between 2001 and
2002.14 His essay ‘How to reduce crime’ (1996b), circulated to members of
Congress during the 1994 crime bill debates (Greene, 2002), advocates dispensing
with ‘socialistic’ community corrections altogether and privatizing policing, pros-
ecution, and correctional services. Reynolds’ later paper Does Punishment Deter
(1998)15 argues in favor of incarceration as a means of reducing crime, and
Factories Behind Bars (1996a) advocates the repeal of all restrictions on convict
labor and the introduction of schemes through which prisoners would be forced to
pay tax-payers back for their ‘upkeep’.
Several of these arguments overlap with positions taken by ALEC (see especially
the group’s links to privatization eﬀorts and legislation promoting prison labor in
Elk and Sloan, 2011), and the organization has particular, long-standing interests
in the commercial bail industry. In 1988, the 12 major insurance companies respon-
sible for underwriting the nations’ multibillion dollar commercial surety bond
industry came together to form the National Association of Bail Insurance
Companies (NABIC). In the early 1990s, NABIC reached out to ALEC and
formed a partnership organization called ‘Strikeback!’. Utilizing a ‘get tough’
ideology and privately funded research, the partnership pushed for the expansion
of commercial bail options as a way to purportedly enhance eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency of the services delivered to taxpayers.
Who or what is ALEC? ALEC consists of two main types of members (see
Nichols, 2011). The ﬁrst are the politicians, almost all at the state level (not
incidentally, where there is less scrutiny of lobbying activity). These ‘legislator
members’ do the work of introducing and pushing for ALEC bills in their states
and are therefore its ‘public face’. According to the group’s own ‘Leaders in the
States’ brochure, ALEC’s legislator members have included governors such as
George Pataki, Zell Miller, and Frank Keating, as well as dozens of Senate
Presidents, Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, and House Majority and
Minority Leaders from various states. The impressive roll call is overwhelm-
ingly, but not entirely, drawn from the Republican Party. The 2400+ legislator
members pay a nominal fee of around $25 per year, in exchange for which they
are able to:
avail themselves of perquisites that can include junkets to prime tourist destinations in
the United States, free or heavily subsidized trips that resemble vacations for their
spouses and children, and an assortment of other fringe beneﬁts that range from no-
cost child care and medical tests to free Broadway theater tickets and dinners at
expensive restaurants. (Schlickeisen and Adams, 2002: 6)
The second type of ALEC member, the ‘corporate sponsor’, pays a great deal
more for membership and yet is largely shrouded from the public gaze. In what
critics refer to as a ‘pay-to-play’ arrangement (Schlickeisen and Adams, 2002),
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corporations and corporate interest groups can become ALEC members for a
fee of up to $50,000. Members paying these more substantial corporate dues
are rewarded with legislative inﬂuence, securing the privilege of sitting on
ALEC’s various committees that draw up and approve ‘model bills’ such as the
CPCRA.
Past co-chairs of ALEC’s Criminal Justice Taskforce (recently renamed the
Public Safety and Elections Taskforce) have included senior executives from the
Corrections Corporation of America, Wackenhut Security, and other private
prison providers. NABIC, recently renamed American Bail Coalition (ABC), has
also been an active private-sector participant in ALEC’s Criminal Justice and
Public Safety and Elections Taskforces. The NABIC/ABC Executive Director
and General Counsel have both served on that Taskforce and spoken at ALEC’s
annual conferences in favor of post-conviction bail and presumably had a hand in
drawing up the CPCRA legislation. In a brochure for its membership, NABIC/
ABC is explicit about how the relationship with ALEC worked and what the
insurance companies gained from it:
In 1995, within two years of joining ALEC, a member of the NABIC Board sat on the
ALEC Board, ALEC had approved several model bills in support of commercial
surety bail, and, furthermore, had completed a study on the failure of government-
funded pretrial release programs (to be followed by a similar additional study two
years later, in 1997). (cited in Schlickeisen and Adams, 2002: 9)16
Not only does this corporate membership buy inﬂuence, then, it also purchases
research, including that which ALEC has subsequently recycled in support of post-
conviction bail. The NABIC/ABC brochure makes clear that this was money well
spent:
For many years NABIC has given considerable ﬁnancial support to ALEC and to the
ALEC Criminal Justice Task Force . . .Through ALEC, NABIC has had a channel to
express its interests to a majority of the states’ speakers of the house and presidents of
the senate. (cited in Schlickeisen and Adams, 2002: 9)
How the post-conviction bail argument works
The argument developed by ALEC and Morgan O. Reynolds (1994, 2000) is highly
compelling in its promise for reform. The ALEC (2007: 4) proposal suggests that
the introduction of post-conviction bail would ‘guarantee low recidivism’ while
simultaneously cutting spending on corrections in a win–win formula. To under-
stand the logic behind these claims, one needs to appreciate a small number of key
‘new penological’ assumptions made by the plan’s advocates: the current system of
parole release is failing; parole primarily involves surveillance and supervision; and
the free market has a unique ability to discipline citizens.
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Parole in crisis. Using data compiled by the Manhattan Institute and, unusually, the
conservative blogger Joseph Farah’s website www.worldnetdaily.com, Reynolds
(2000: 1) argues that community corrections are in crisis and that ‘legislators are
disgusted with the disrespect for the unsecured probation and parole system dis-
played by criminals’. Likewise, in a newsletter for the bail bonds industry, a rep-
resentative of the industry decries the ‘early release problem’ in the USA, and
argues that, ‘society will not tolerate the wholesale early release of convicted
felons to be supervised by an already overburdened parole system’ (Whitlock,
2007: 1).
Yet, what is the prisoner release ‘crisis’ that so disturbs citizens and legislators?
ALEC’s proposal reviews the usual ﬁndings of prisoner release research, including
well-known statistics about the numbers of released prisoners who are rearrested
for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years. High caseloads of proba-
tion and parole bureaucracies and the levels of prison overcrowding facing states
are also cited. However, advocates argue that the worst ‘crisis’ in parole is the
number of individuals under supervision who abscond and are not found.17
Reynolds (2000: 8) writes,
Pursuit of those who violate probation or parole would be more eﬀective because
unlike police, bounty hunters have strong incentives to recover fugitives – they get
paid only if they get their man. In addition, they can go freely to any jurisdiction and
use any lawful means to apprehend a fugitive.
These lawful rights granted to bondsmen (and transferred to bounty hunters)
include the right to ‘enter a fugitive’s house without a warrant’ (Reynolds, 2000: 8).
Of course, if this is a more eﬃcient means of detecting parole violators (and there is
doubt here, see Feeley, 2002b), there is a logical contradiction in regard to how this
will lead to cost savings, as presumably such recalled parolees would increase
prisoner numbers.
Probation/parole work as purely enforcement of rules. The second, notable assumption of
the ALEC proposal is that the work involved in ex-prisoner reintegration is pri-
marily surveillance-oriented. The proposal states:
Failure of the releasee to meet numerous requirements such as house arrest, regular
drug testing, recovery program involvement, mandatory check-in requirements, non-
interference with witnesses or victims, maintenance of gainful employment, payment
of restitution, and no subsequent arrests or any additional requirements would obli-
gate the surety to promptly return the releasee to custody thus safeguarding the com-
munity. Failure to so perform would subject the surety to full ﬁnancial penalty under
the bond. (ALEC, 2007: 3)
Note that, according to this hypothetical scenario, the commercial bonding
agency would not lose its investment if the individual violates the conditions
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of parole. So long as the parolee is promptly returned to custody after the
violation, the bonding agency is not held responsible. Clearly, then, bondsmen
have little incentive to promote desistance from crime, as both a return to
custody and desistance count as community ‘safeguarding’ and the former is
surely easier to ‘guarantee’ than the latter. In such circumstances, it is not at all
clear how the plan would reduce prison overcrowding, and it is easy to imagine
the opposite.
After all, the sole function envisioned for the commercial bonding agent is
an enforcement one. Unlike the traditional parole oﬃcer, the bonding organ-
ization apparently would not assume responsibility for helping the person ﬁnd
employment or assisting with the struggles of reintegration. All that bounty
hunters would have to do is monitor the individual and bring them to jail if
they fail to live up to any of the notoriously diﬃcult conditions associated
with parole. The premise is a pure ‘tail ’em, nail ’em and jail ’em’ model of
supervision (Skeem and Manchak, 2008) or what Simon (1993) describes as a
‘waste management’ model. If more work is required in the reintegration pro-
cess, then this will have to be delivered by another agency. In their position
statement on ALEC’s proposal, the American Probation and Parole
Association (APPA) (2009) argues that since ‘actual supervision . . . involves
substantially more than appearing in court’ it is likely that the bonding com-
panies would have to charge substantially more than the 10 percent of the bail
amount typically charged for pretrial commercial bond to truly replace trad-
itional forms of parole.
Markets and responsibilization. ‘Free market’ ideology plays a role in both the argu-
ments for cost savings as well as the claims for recidivism reduction, and both
claims are based on unchecked assumptions. At its most fanciful, the argument
is sometimes made that the bail program would ‘pay for itself’, or in other words:
‘To the greatest extent possible,’ the ALEC (2007: 3) proposal states, ‘the pro-
gram’s costs should be borne by criminals’. However, this is contradicted in the
details of the plan itself. As prisoners are unlikely to be able to aﬀord to pay for
their own bail on prison wages, the ALEC report clearly indicates that it would be
their families and supporters who will be expected bear this burden. Reynolds
(2000: 7) argues that ‘There is ample precedent for payment of such fees since a
majority of the states already allow local probation departments to collect fees
from probationers.’ However, critics of these fees argue that levying them against
the ﬁnancially strapped families of prisoners, already overburdened with the costs
associated with visitation and prison phone calls, would be an impediment to suc-
cessful reentry (Goodman, 2008).
Additional savings could conceivably emerge from the dismantling of the pub-
licly run probation and parole bureaucracies, as ‘a private bonding system would
reduce, though probably not eliminate, the need for probation and parole oﬃcers
on the public payroll’, according to Reynolds (2000: 8). Advocates also point to
savings achieved by releasing oﬀenders into the community from costly terms of
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incarceration (Collateral, 2010), ironically sometimes borrowing the language of
criminal justice reform eﬀorts on the political Left (see Maruna, 2011a).
However, it is not clear that individuals would serve less time in prison than
they currently do.
The key premise around recidivism reduction involves the ability of ﬁnancial
incentives to discipline and responsibilize a population (Feeley, 2002b):
Best of all, the program would rely on the proven success of the bail bond industry,
rather than the proven dysfunction of the government-run parole and probation
system, by requiring families and communities to take some responsibility for
future acts of the person who is displaying signs of trouble. (ALEC, 2007: 3)
Accordingly, if there is a violation of the bond, ‘the family as well as the
oﬀender would be drawn into the circle of responsibility’ (2007: 3). Under their
proposal, the always fraught calculus of risk or dangerousness is conveniently
replaced with what Reynolds (2000: 7) refers to as a ‘market mechanism for
deciding whom to release’. He argues: ‘If no intimate of the criminal or any
private bondsman cared enough to risk their own money on the candidate for
probation or parole, why should the general public risk that person on the
streets?’ As the bail model is premised on the ability of ﬁnancial incentives to
control behavior, those without adequate ﬁnances become automatically too risky
to release.
Considerable evidence suggests this would rule out a sizable proportion of indi-
viduals currently released on parole. Maryland, for instance, has experimented with
a ‘supervision fee’ for parolees, charging them just $40 per month to ﬁnance their
own supervision in a populist eﬀort to save the state money and ‘get tough’ on
prisoners. Yet, research suggests that the fees are ‘largely uncollectible due to the
dire ﬁnancial situation in which parolees ﬁnd themselves’ and that the debts that
accumulate ‘do more harm than good’ by impeding the reintegration process
(Diller et al., 2009: 1). New research details the considerable ﬁnancial and social
strain that a family member’s imprisonment has on families (Christian, 2005;
Travis and Waul, 2003). Forcing such innocents to pay for their family member’s
release on top of all the other hardships they face could be seen as a form of
collective punishment.
For insurance companies to make a proﬁt from such circumstances will be seen
as unfair to many (see, for example, APPA, 2009), but supporters of post-
conviction bail appear unconcerned about such consequences. In a glowing proﬁle
of post-conviction bail in the bail industry magazine Collateral, Dennis Bartlett –
the Executive Director of the American Bail Coalition and a member of ALEC – is
quoted as saying:
I would make the argument, ‘So what if they’re making money oﬀ of it? You hire food
service and have competitors bid on it. That provider’s not going to do it for free. You
just want to get the one who does it the way you want.’ (Collateral, 2010)
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What might the future hold? Learning from bail’s history
In many ways, ALEC’s arguments all boil down to one core claim: that pretrial
commercial bail in the United States has itself been a clear success,18 so why not
import the model into parole?
Privatization is not a radical concept; it would involve little more than transferring the
principles of the commercial bail bonding system, used successfully for criminal
defendants, to those found guilty of crimes but eligible for early release on probation
or parole. (Reynolds, 2000: 4)
In this section, therefore, we review this history in order to help understand the
future of parole.
In many ways, pre-trial bail has been an institution ahead of its time – it
embodied the ‘new penology’ before the new penology was ‘new’. Today, despite
changes in ideology, variations in usage levels, and a host of programmatic altera-
tions, the unique US system of bail has retained its core principles of privatization,
managerialism, and actuarial justice for two centuries (Feeley, 1983; Goldfarb,
1965; Thomas, 1976). There are identiﬁable eras within this history, most notably
a formative era of deﬁnition and clariﬁcation (1800–1950), a liberal era of due
process reforms (1950–1975), a conservative era of law and order reforms (1975–
1990), and recently (1990–present) a managerial era stressing bureaucratic eﬃ-
ciency. Although each era is discernable by the signiﬁcant events, judicial rulings,
legislation, empirical inquiries, and public accounts occurring during the period,
considerable continuities can also be found across all eras (Dabney et al., 2005).
That is, we make the case that the more things have changed, the more they have
stayed the same.
Presented with a potential market, proﬁt-minded companies have long stepped
forward to serve the role of commercial bondsmen. This entrepreneurial impulse is
routinely interrupted by crises – usually in the form of scholarly and media inqui-
ries that reveal corruption and injustices in the system. Yet, repeatedly, the bail
bond industry has reemerged more capable and inﬂuential. Below, we describe the
resilience of commercial bail practices against a century of legal challenges, legis-
lative reforms, and public critiques. Given the similarities between the proposed
post-conviction conditional release model and the longstanding commercial bail
system, we posit a similar fate for the US system of parole once privatization is
introduced.
The resilience of commercial bail
State authorities have encouraged the promise (or payment) of assets in exchange
for pretrial release for at least 1500 years. From its early days in the seventh cen-
tury, the English common law system of bail has been based on the concepts of
recognizance and liability. Originally, the surety and the accused were bound ‘body
to body’ during the adjudication process, with the understanding that the ﬁnal
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punishment could be meted out against the surety if the principal was not present in
court at the time of sentencing (DeHaas, 1940; Duker, 1977). Personal ties inspired
the surety to use his/her own assets to gain the release of the accused and vouch for
that individual’s future appearance at trial. The currency of this promissory con-
tract evolved from one’s own life and liberty, to land forfeiture, and eventually a
monetary sum.
The transient nature of the American frontier quickly rendered ineﬀective a bail
system based on private promissory contracts. Most oﬀenders had few willing
sureties available to them and often chose pretrial ﬂight over the prospect of a
harsh term of incarceration. A commercial bail system, based on monetary obli-
gation rather than moral or land-based obligation was thus cast as a uniquely
American solution.
The seeds of this commercial bail industry can be traced back to the late 19th
century when part-time attorneys, ‘loan sharks’, and saloon owners utilized upon
their resources and connections to provide for-proﬁt release to needy defendants
(Chamberlin, 1998). Soon thereafter, full-time private bail bondsmen emerged.
Bondsmen learned that it was advantageous to foster good relationships with the
court clerk, desk sergeant, prosecutor, defense attorneys, and even the judge as a
means of funneling low risk, high yield defendants their way. Given the reciprocal
nature of the relationship between bondsmen and justice authorities, common
goals and biases emerged.
By the end of the Great Depression, all 50 states and the federal government had
adopted statutes regulating the judicial practice of bail (Hayes, 1937). While statu-
tory variation existed, most granted the judge discretion to consider the defendant’s
character, criminal history, current charge severity, the weight of the evidence
against him/her, and so on, as related to the probability of appearance at trial.
Each law speciﬁed the types of bail that were accepted by the trial court. The list
usually included private money bail (a deposit provided by the accused or his/her
family/friends), property bail (property used as collateral for the bail amount),
commercial bail (recognizance pledge provided by a third party), and release on
one’s own recognizance. From the outset, legislators generally adopted a minim-
alist approach when codifying bail processes, choosing to deﬁne only those struc-
tures and processes identiﬁed within existing judicial precedents (Friedman, 1976).
Bail laws contained few provisions governing the conduct of bondsmen, surety
insurers, or bounty hunters.
The cozy relationships between bondsmen and members of the court and law
enforcement community prompted some criticism and several social scientiﬁc
inquiries into the administration of bail (Beeley, 1927; Pound and Frankfurter,
1922). These inquiries produced damning reports of bondsman corruption, collu-
sion with criminal justice authorities, and abuses against indigent defendants
(Goldfarb, 1965; Thomas, 1976). Moreover, they directed attention to the under-
lying structure of the bail system and its propensity to produce bias against poor
defendants. Local (e.g. New York City) and national inquiries (e.g. Wickersham
Commission) conﬁrmed biased judicial bail setting practices and collusion and
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prompted modest reforms. Instead of confronting head on the constitutional
abstractness of the right to bail and/or judicial application thereof, reformers
sought to maintain the core ideals of a commercialized system but reign in the
bail bond industry (Thomas, 1976).
Bondsmen grew comfortable as the reform eﬀorts of the 1930s died down. They
once again began to collude with criminal justice practitioners and indigent defend-
ants began to suﬀer en mass (Goldfarb, 1965). This prompted another spate of
social science research and commentary depicting practical and legal limitations in
bail administration. The Philadelphia Bail Study, for instance, found biases against
indigent defendants; bail amounts were generic in nature, inversely related to
release rates, and placed poor defendants at the highest risk of detention.
Conversely, judges used bail levels to punish defendants and high failure-to-appear
rates and low forfeiture rates suggested that the system was proﬁtable for bonds-
men who bore little risk but plenty of reward. Follow-up studies (Foote et al., 1958;
Rankin, 1964; Suﬀet, 1966), partisan critiques (see, for example, Goldfarb, 1965),
media expose´s (see, for example, Davis, 1982 or Thomas, 1976), and multiple
oﬃcial inquiries and investigations at the state and federal levels (DeRhoda,
1979) yielded equally damning results and suggested that little had changed since
Beeley’s 1927 inquiry.
Around this time, liberal reforms shifted the focus toward due process protec-
tions for the accused individual. Release on recognizance (ROR) programs enacted
structured screening by private volunteers and evidence-based release recommen-
dations to be made to judges. The Bail Reform Act of 1966 (18 USC § 3146) soon
established ROR as the preferred form of pretrial release for the federal court
system. These programs reduced judicial discretion and cut into the business of
commercial bondsmen, but often proved to be more restrictive than traditional
bail, as states rigidly imposed the stated criteria for release and revocation
(Feeley, 2002a).
ROR programs were not the only liberal reform initiative introduced during the
1960s. In 1963, Illinois enacted into law a 10 percent deposit bond program under
which defendants could gain pretrial release by pledging one-tenth of their bail
amount directly to the court (Bowman, 1965). Here, the court assumed the position
of bondsman and became much more user-friendly to defendants, especially indi-
gent ones. Numerous state and local jurisdictions passed 10 percent deposit bond
laws.
Such reforms however were directly challenged by the commercial bail com-
munity who sought to roll back government-funded ‘public bail’ models in favor
of ‘private bail’. The bonding industry made the case that government programs
were overly rigid in their application, led to higher failure to appear rates, and
placed an undue burden on taxpayers.19 In some cases, local action was under-
taken to stem the impact of reforms. For example, New York City bondsmen, in
1961 and again in 1964, responded to threats posed by the Manhattan Bail
Project and tightened forfeiture enforcement by carrying out a strike of sorts.
Bondsmen began limiting bonds to those defendants who could cover the full bail
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amount through cash or collateral. This led to jail overcrowding and concessions
on the part of city oﬃcials.
These organizational eﬀorts spread to the national level. In 1962, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners proposed the Uniform Bail Bond Act
which required member surety insurers to license and regulate bondsmen and
subagents with whom they contracted. The Act also served as model legislation
calling for bondsmen to be regulated under state insurance commissioners’
oﬃces. It contained provisions for licensure qualiﬁcations, standardized premium
rates, and sanctions against speciﬁed oﬀenses committed by bondsmen. By 1971,
seven states enacted laws modeled after this act. Bondsmen also formed the
American Association of Professional Bail Agents in the mid-1970s. This organ-
ization identiﬁed 5000 bonding companies nationwide and coordinated lobbying
eﬀorts to deﬁne and defend its legitimacy as a privatized arm of the criminal
justice system.
Despite numerous reform eﬀorts, then, the ‘liberal era’ of bail’s history also
demonstrates the resiliency of the commercial bail industry in the face of threat.
In the mid-1960s, Goldfarb (1965) estimated that 10–12 million defendants
(70 percent of all felons and 90 percent of all misdemeanants) were still procuring
release via commercial bail bonds each year. This translated into annual industry
proﬁts in excess of $20 million.
The 1980s witnessed another cycle of entrepreneurialism–crisis–reorganization.
The ‘War on Drugs’ produced spikes in arrests and prosecutions and took away
judges’ ﬂexibility to make deliberate and personalized bail decisions and led to
increased numbers of defendants in need of bail. Commercial bail bonding entities
responded by streamlining their bureaucratic structure, standardizing administra-
tive processes, and reinventing the industry using a corporate model. Over time, the
need to write more bonds with smaller commissions led to a reduction in entrepre-
neurial bondsmen and an increase in the market share controlled by indemnity
insurance companies (Chamberlain, 1998) who were able to address bail as a ‘high
volume/low proﬁt margin’ business model.
Most recently, the crisis for the commercial system of bail has come in the form
of a decrease in crime rates and tight governmental budgets in the 1990s and ﬁrst
decade of the 21st century. The customer base from which commercial bondmen
can draw has decreased signiﬁcantly as of late. Kennedy and Henry (1996) note
that reliance on commercial surety bail decreased 15 percent in 1990 and 13 percent
in 1992. They further report that 17 percent of felony defendants in these jurisdic-
tions were ineligible for bail under prescribed preventive detention laws. In many
jurisdictions (e.g. Illinois), commercial bail has neared extinction, and there have
been important developments at the federal level and in states like Virginia to
rationalize pretrial risk assessment processes (Lowenkamp and Whetzel, 2009).
Chamberlin estimated that there existed no more than 8000 commercial bonding
ﬁrms and 1000 full time bounty hunters in 1998. Members of the commercial bail
industry are now concentrated in select jurisdictions that remain friendly to their
brand of pretrial release (Toborg et al., 1985).
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Faced with this growing crisis, however, the commercial bonding industry has
increased the nature and extent of its political lobbying eﬀorts. New ‘grassroots’
organizations have formed to guide the debate over how to best deal with defend-
ants awaiting trial. In 1988, the 12 major insurance companies that underwrite the
commercial surety bond industry came together to form a lobbying entity, the
National Association of Bail Insurance Companies (NABIC). The Professional
Bail Agents of the United States (PBUS) was formed to advocate on behalf of
commercial bail bondsmen to lobby on behalf of local bondsmen.20 The National
Association of Bail Enforcement Agents (NABEA) emerged to lobby in favor of
private fugitive recovery,21 and the National Institute of Bail Enforcement and
other regional training academies have been formed to enhance the skills and
professionalism of local bounty hunters. Through ALEC and other legislative
channels, these groups have been able to maintain the proﬁtability of commercial
bail against great odds (see Kennedy and Henry, 1996).
Judicial endorsement of commercialized justice
The commercial bail industry has proven to be as resistant to judicial obstacles as it
has been to legislative eﬀorts. Indeed, as Feeley (1983: 77) points out, legal chal-
lenges to current bail practices have met primarily with ‘numbing defeats’. Starting
in the early 19th century, appellate courts began handing down decisions that
consistently supported the monetary-based system of conditional pretrial release.
Leary v. United States (1912), Nicholls v. Ingersoll (1810) and Taylor v. Taintor
(1872) each contributed to a judicial precedent that by virtue of a signed bail
contract granted a third party surety full custodial rights over the accused, aﬀorded
the bondsman broad powers of arrest, custody, and retrieval over the accused (that
far exceeded those of law enforcement agents without any of the due process
restrictions), and legitimized the bondsman’s hiring bounty hunters as subagents.
Even appellate reviews of the commercial bail system by the a liberal Supreme
Court headed by Earl Warren (1953–1969) yielded only minor limits on the
broad common law authority granted to bonding agents and bounty hunters
(Curtis v. Peerless Insurance Co., 1969; Livingston v. Browder, 1973; Ouzts v.
Maryland National Insurance Co., 1974).
In the 1980s, a more conservative Supreme Court issued decisions such as
Schall v. Martin (1984) and United States v. Salerno (1987) that articulate the
judiciary’s endorsement of preventive detention and the use of dangerousness
assessments in bail decision-making processes. The courts have consistently dis-
played a willingness to endorse the privatization of a critical function of the
criminal justice system and aﬀorded judges, bondsmen, and bounty hunters con-
siderable leeway in their respective decision-making capacities. Given the parallels
in the ideology and proposed administrative structures, we submit that these
rulings provide advocates of conditional post-conviction release with an import-
ant judicial footing upon which to justify and defend their proposed reforms to
parole.
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Conclusion: The future of parole?
At the close of the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, the US system of commercial
bail remains integral to the day-to-day functioning of our justice system. Practically
speaking, sureties are expected to perform some of the same functions as probation
or parole oﬃcers but do so from a privileged legal position (i.e. few due process
limits or government oversight and minimal risk of liability). Private entities have
always been aﬀorded loose due process obligations, limited governmental surveil-
lance, and weak models of accountability when contract terms are not met. For
about 100 years, this commercial system of bail has consistently exhibited the same
beneﬁts and limitations. It provides numerous pretrial release options for defend-
ants with ﬁnancial means, protecting the presumption of innocence, alleviates jail
overcrowding, increases levels of non-state social control and monitoring of crim-
inal defendants, assists the courtroom workgroup in managing caseloads, and the-
oretically provides cost savings for US taxpayers. On the downside, the US system
of bail has been accused of discriminating against the poor, injecting proﬁt motive
into a public service function, breeding corruption and abuse of power, and
increasing the risk of wrongful imprisonment. Today more than half a million
individuals are in US jails – at a cost of around $9 billion to taxpayers – because
they cannot aﬀord to post bail. These shortcomings continue to trigger occasional
bursts of public outrage (see, for example, Sullivan, 2010), yet, none of these criti-
cisms have signiﬁcantly altered the core of the commercial system in many US
states. Despite a history of reform eﬀorts from the political Left and Right, pri-
vatization and managerial ideals have held sway over competing principles of just-
ice and fairness (see Feeley and Simon, 1994).
This history of bail does not necessarily foretell the future for parole. There is
every chance that what has worked, politically, in the area of pretrial release will
not hold the same sway in terms of post-conviction release. The release of prisoners
is a fraught and emotive process, and the frightening connotations of the phrase
‘early release’ can politically doom even the most logical reforms (see Maruna,
2011b for a discussion). It is possible that post-conviction bail will fail politically
because of the insinuation that it would allow those with means to ‘buy’ their own
early release putting the public at risk. Moreover, although both parole and pretrial
detention are characterized by strong actuarial forces (calculating the likelihood of
an individual’s posing a risk to society), parole also has been associated with desert.
There is, after all, a long-standing idea that one should ‘earn’ one’s release from
prison, unlike jail (Padﬁeld, 2007). Finally, there has been a renewal of interest in
prisoner reintegration eﬀorts in the past decade under the banner of ‘reentry’ and
the Second Chance Act (see Travis, 2005). This might represent a ﬁght-back against
a decade of simplistic ‘tail ’em, nail ’em and jail ’em’ approaches to parole work
that opened the door to the de-professionalization of community corrections
departments in the ﬁrst place.
Nonetheless, we argue that once privatization is introduced into the parole
equation, it is likely to grow – even if these eﬀorts do not reduce crime and
(remarkably) even if they do not save the states money. If nothing else, the history
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of pre-trial bail in the United States demonstrates that once a proﬁt motive is
introduced, the industry emerging around the issue begins to take on a life of
its own and issues of ‘eﬀectiveness’ and eﬃciency become clouded. Feeley
(2002a: 322), for instance, argues persuasively that: ‘When successful, private
eﬀorts have increased not decreased the reach of government. In the long run
they have expanded, not contracted public social control. They have increased
not decreased public expenditures.’ In short, the commercial bail industry has
survived not necessarily because it reduces crime or saves money, but rather
thanks to friends in high places, like ALEC. Those same friends with money
may soon decide who does and does not get released from prison.
Notes
1. These states moved to a ‘deposit bonds’ system paid directly to courts. Maine,
Nebraska and the District of Columbia also have little commercial bail activity
due to regulations in those states (Cohen and Reaves, 2007).
2. We focus primarily on the use of commercial bail in the context of parole.
However, parallel efforts exist to incorporate commercial bail principles into pro-
bation. Under this model, individuals without monetary means would be denied
community correction options and default to a term of incarceration.
3. See Drimmer (1996) and Kaufman (1999) for thorough analyses of the legal land-
scape pertaining to bounty hunters and bonding entities.
4. The subject of bail has received relatively little scrutiny or structured empirical
inquiry in this historical work. This is particularly troubling considering the
highly discretionary nature of bail practices and the tension between individual
rights and public safety inherent in the bail bonding system. The historical analysis
provided here relies primarily on secondary sources and serves to review and orga-
nize existing observations more so than provide new ones.
5. Non-commercial pre-trial bail bonding is a common but not universal feature in
criminal justice systems internationally, and comparative international research is
badly needed in this area, especially comparative work outlining divergences
between US and British practices.
6. Haynes is the former Senate Republican Whip for California and also served as
National Chairman of ALEC.
7. See the following link for legislative updates: htp://www.collateralmag.com/post-
conviction-bonds-a-promising-solution-to-prison-overcrowding/ Other states are
active in their preparation efforts according to recent ALEC conference proceed-
ings: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼mWf3U-Rky6s&feature¼related.
8. It is worth noting that the text of these three pieces of legislation is nearly identical.
9. Other states such as Georgia have constitutional provisions forbidding judicial
intervention in parole matters but have used administrative guidelines that allow
for the Board of Pardons and Parole to contract with electronic monitoring com-
panies to serve as sureties for inmates released under terms of home confinement
(§17-6-1.1).
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10. Online proceedings of the organization’s 2008 Annual Meeting (http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v¼O8nUeJmdf0g) and 2009 States and Nation Policy Summit
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼mWf3U-Rky6s&feature¼related) capture
legislative members and representatives from the commercial bail industry provid-
ing debriefings on the plan for the legislators in attendance.
11. When passing ‘truth in sentencing’ legislation in the 1990s, states relied on the
model legislation developed by ALEC. Former head of Wisconsin’s prison
system, Walter Dickey, told reporters that ‘There was never any mention that
ALEC or anybody else had any involvement in this’ (Olsson, 2002: 2).
12. For instance, ALEC (2007: 1) cites Reynolds’ (2000) paper to defend the claim that
‘15 murders a day are committed by people under government supervision’. This
statistic is indeed asserted in Reynolds paper, but it is not referenced. Additionally,
ALEC cites Reynolds to make the claim that 53 percent of prison inmates were on
probation, parole, or pretrial release at the time of their incarceration, yet this
statistic does not appear in the version of Reynolds’ (2000) paper that is available
online.
13. In a footnote, Reynolds (2000: 13) writes, ‘It was the late bail bondsman
Gerald Monks of Houston, Texas, former executive director of the Professional
Bail Agents of the United States, who originally brought this idea to my
attention.’
14. Today, Reynolds is best known as one of the leading ‘conspiracy theorists’ regard-
ing the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001, arguing that the official accounts of the
towers’ collapse are ‘bogus’ and that the deaths resulted from a ‘controlled demo-
lition’ (Landis, 2005; Levitt, 2005; see also Reynolds’ ‘official website’ at http://
nomoregames.net/).
15. The National Institute of Corrections keeps an online copy of the paper on file in
its ‘library’ archive at http://www.nicic.org/Library/014974.
16. Similar claims are captured in online video footage of NABIC/ABC officers pre-
senting at ALEC conferences: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼O8nUeJmdf0g
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼mWf3U-Rky6s&feature¼related).
17. Here, ALEC (2007) and Reynolds (2000) use a report by the Manhattan Institute
for Policy Research, a free market think tank established by William Casey.
18. Interestingly, as evidence of this huge claim, the ALEC (2007) proposal cites
Reynolds’s (2000) research, who in turn cites unpublished studies funded by
ALEC. This ‘hired gun’ quality characterizes much of the research purporting to
prove the superiority of commercial surety bail over other forms of pretrial bail (see
especially Kennedy and Henry, 1996).
19. In 1986, Gerald Monks, the Executive Director of the Professional Bail Agents of
the United States, testified before Congress that $30 billion went unpaid to the
Government annually due to ROR forfeitures, with an average cost of $800 for
each skip recovery (Monks, 1986).
20. The PBUS website claims that their membership has grown to over 15,000 and
nearly half of all states have produced their own local organizations comprised of
owners/operators of local bail bond firms.
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21. By 1990, Burton reported that the membership had grown to 100 bounty hunters,
plus a dozen bail bondsmen and several surety insurance companies.
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